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Abstract:  
This paper draws on Margaret Radin's theorization of "contested commodities" to explore the 
process whereby informal housing becomes formalized but also shaped by legal regulation. In 
seeking to move once informal housing into the domain of official legality, cities can seldom rely 
on a simple legal framework of private law principles of property and contract. Instead, they face 
complex trade-offs between providing basic needs and affordability and meeting public law 
norms around living standards, traditional neighbourhood feel, and the environment. This paper 
highlights these issues through an examination of the uneven process of legal formalization of 
basement apartments in Vancouver, Canada. Choosing a long time period -- from 1928 to 2009 -
- we explore how basement apartments became a vital source of housing often at odds with city 
planning that is ill-designed to accommodate population growth.  We suggest that Radin's 
theoretical account makes possible identifying legalization and official market construction with 
both questions of whether to permit commodification and how to permit commodification.  Real 
world commodification processes -- including legal sanction -- reflect hybridization, pragmatic 
decision-making and regulatory compromise. The resolutions of questions concerning how to 
legalize commodification are also intertwined with processes of market expansion. 
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Introduction   
 Informal housing in cities can involve complex problems concerning the relationship of 
formal law to illegality, underlying housing market dynamics, and the role of the state in market 
construction. While in the Global South the policy debate has largely focused on establishing 
property rights and access to finance, in the Global North responses often revolve around 
enforcing codes and standards in the face of small developers and homeowners who circumvent 
zoning bylaws through building and renting out garages, basements, or subdividing suburban 
houses. In seeking to move once informal housing into the domain of official legality, cities can 
seldom rely on a simple legal framework of private law principles of property and contract. 
Instead, political pressure and a history of public law means that the local state must take a more 
active role and engage in forms of market construction, balancing the way informal housing can 
provide affordable options with the perceived need for rules pertaining to living standards  or 
traditional neighbourhood feel. Further, the Smart Growth agenda has brought environmental 
concerns to the table, showing how informal housing sectors contribute to urban densification, 
and provide ways of breaking the carbon lock-in of sprawl, automobility and single-family 
zoning. Informal housing thus stands at the juncture of how housing is simultaneously part of the 
urban eco-social metabolism, a marketable good -- or commodity -- and an entity shaped by legal 
regulation and socio-environmental values. This paper explores this conjuncture by examining 
Margaret Radin's (1996) theorization of "contested commodities" and extending her framework 
through considering the simultaneous legal formalization, and ongoing illegality, of accessory 
apartments in Vancouver, Canada. We discuss how Radin's theoretical account makes possible 
the identification of legalization and official market construction with questions of whether to 
permit commodification and how to permit commodification. We also show how reframing 
informal housing issues in this fashion helps bring to light the way capitalist urban development 
can morph to accommodate and absorb social opposition. 
Unauthorized accessory apartments result from the illegal subdivision of detached 
dwellings by their owners, and are usually rented out to help offset mortgage payments. Such 
apartments are common in many North American cities, but they typically constitute a marginal 
proportion of the housing stock. In Vancouver, however, this type of housing constitutes an 
estimated 10 percent of all occupied dwelling units in the city (___________), acting as an 
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important source of low cost rental housing and enabling significant increases in density while 
preserving the single-family housing  'feel' of low-density residential neighbourhoods. Most of 
the city was envisioned in the 1920s (and later built) according to Harland Bartholomew’s (and 
behind that, Frederick Law Olmstead Jr.'s) vision of bringing nature to the city through treed 
streets laid out in grid iron, opulent parks and middle-class neighbourhoods where housing was 
largely restricted to single-family dwellings. While this has now been supplemented by high 
condominium towers in the city centre and some mid-rise developments on neighbourhood high 
streets, most of the city continues to conform to this single-family vision -- but only as an 
aesthetic façade. Accessory apartments (known by the City as "secondary suites") house 
families, students and individual working class households in subdivided main floors but most 
typically in retrofitted basements, "invisibly" turning single-family dwellings into multi-family 
housing. In some Vancouver neighbourhoods (such as the 'funky' area of Commercial 
Drive/Grandview-Woodlands) a majority (or 59 percent) of houses have basement suites (City of 
Vancouver, 2009a). While initially supported during the Second World War and the domestic 
'war effort', basement suites were officially suppressed or ignored during the post war Fordist-
Keynesian era. Over time, however, the City has developed a unique solution to the problem of 
formally recognizing and encouraging secondary suites as contributors to housing affordability 
and Smart Growth: On the one hand it authorizes suites only if they conform to local building 
codes and standards, and on the other hand it follows a stated policy of rarely enforcing this rule. 
Radin's theoretical framework of 'contested commodities', we argue, helps disentangle the 
regulatory compromises the City has reached in its peculiar approach to dealing with basement 
suites. Radin juxtaposes theories of possessive individualism (from Thomas Hobbes, through to 
law and economic scholars such as Gary Becker and Richard Posner) and Marxian 
commodification theory (from Karl Marx to literary critic Georg Lukacs). While the former is a 
pro-commodification 'archetype' and the latter a 'counter-archetype,' both approaches work with 
a formal ideal of property and contract distant from real life commodification processes. Radin's 
work is well known in legal studies and feminist scholarship, and some scholars have recognized 
how her work destabilizes ideas of commodification and can be used to understand regulated 
markets (Parry, 2008). However, it has not been applied to the study of city-making processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interpretation we propose here highlights the relevance of her 'contested commodities' 
framework to the field of urban studies. 
In this paper, we demonstrate how Radin's framework encourages a joint analysis of both 
market imaginaries (i.e. different ideas for how to make and legally frame markets) and the 
processes of contestation and compromise that develop as such imaginaries make way for legal 
decision-making and institutional building. Radin leads us to focus attention on the discourses 
surrounding social policy, the continuing role of commodifying archetypes, and the conceptual 
shifts involved in pragmatic decision-making and regulatory compromise.  Recognizing the 
theoretical utility of the abstract notion of "commodity form," we draw on Radin's work to argue 
that it is equally important to pay attention to particular, contingent, discursively and legally 
constituted modes of commodification. As such, we show how Vancouver's basement suites 
provide unique subterranean and green types of commodification.  
 In what follows we first provide a sum-up of our close reading of Radin's "contested 
commodities" argument, which we use as an entry point for understanding basement suites in 
Vancouver. We then provide a brief overview of British Columbia's property law system, and 
move to the City of Vancouver's secondary suite policy. (We follow the convention of 
capitalizing "City" when referring to the local government.) Through the 1950s and 1960s there 
was a pro-active (but unsuccessful and weakly applied) policy of resisting suites. From the 1970s 
to 1990s, this was followed by a policy of non-enforcement as the state turned a blind eye. In the 
2000s there was a process of regularization which, by decade's end, opened the way for active 
policies to promote and expand suites under the influence of environmental "Smart Growth" 
policies.  
We argue that Radin's framework is both particularly useful but potentially troubled by 
the case of Vancouver's basement suites. When the City moved to legalize suites, it did so 
through novel forms of regulation that reflected a mix of pro- and counter-commodification 
rhetorics as Radin's approach would suggest. The result -- read through Radin's work -- was the 
formation of policies concerning how to commodify, or more specifically the setting of legal 
rules to help situate the practice within societal norms. However -- and here we go beyond 
Radin's thought -- when we move from discourse analysis to study urban process we see that 
successful legal resolution of the 'how question' can also lead to the expansion of 
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commodification: Vancouver's policies did result in partial conversion of existing properties into 
rental stock, but this shift has both facilitated and condoned the transfer of more of the city's 
living space to the realm of monetary exchange.   
 
Theorizing Contested Commodification  
 Radin's (1996) Contested Commodities is addressed at resolving social policy questions 
such as the legalization of prostitution or surrogate motherhood, but does so through engaging 
with political theory of commodification (c.f. Prudham, 2009).  Commodification theorists have 
often focused on the 'commodity form' and analyzed the underlying logics implicit in the sale of 
goods for money. For instance, exchange is said to involve a process of abstraction whereby the 
specificity of a thing is lost as qualitatively distinct things are rendered equivalent and 
exchangeable (Castree, 2003). Radin's key move is to identify discourses of and about 
commodification and explore their relationship -- one marked often by disconnect and 
dissimilarity as much as causal connection -- with real world, legally constituted 
commodification processes.  
 Radin follows in a tradition of legal scholarship, found in writers such as Evgeny 
Pashukanis (1923) and Duncan Kennedy (1985), which identifies property and contract law as 
central to commodification processes. But as Kennedy has shown, this move reveals the ways 
commodification does not involve only the idea of ownership and exchange, but its instantiation 
in legal institutions and extra-legal regulatory processes such as social norms. Much 
commodification theory implicitly works with nineteenth-century formalist property and contract 
theory: It thus fails to recognize the way social welfare states incorporated the legal realist 
revolution and its recognition that contract and property are 'bundles of rights' the state can 
intervene to transform. The actual rules which underlie commodity production are constantly 
being changed and deflected in new directions as part of "a moving project" (Kennedy, 1985, 
997), none of which are seen by Kennedy as capable of being captured by abstract theories. From 
this perspective, the idea of the commodity form is 'hopelessly imprecise' (Kennedy, 1985, 1000) 
and fails to capture the complexity and ever changing nature of actual commodity regulation. 
Radin's implicit answer to this problematic is to suggest that abstract ideals of ownership and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
exchange still have life but do so as discourses, and these unevenly influence the policy process. 
This paves the way for Radin to make a series of novel interventions. 
 
Social and Participant Aspects of Commodification 
 First, Radin points out that dominant political theories in the Western tradition can be 
analyzed for how they embody abstract ideals of commodification, and thereby analyzed for all 
their failings and over-generalizations. She singles out three visions in particular: 
 
• "Universal, complete commodification" or "complete commodification in rhetoric," 
exemplified in Thomas Hobbes, Chicago School neo-classical economics, and writers 
such as Gary Becker and Richard Posner who are central to the law and economics 
movement. This vision seeks to describe -- and reform -- all aspects of social life to 
conform to a vision of persons as commodity holders and the world as an object of 
exchange value. Because it ignores many non-market forms of value -- such as human 
dignity or essential features of personhood -- it operates as an archetype: it is 
"oversimplified, a caricature" (Radin, 1996, 2) and "lends itself to easy 
deconstruction" (p. 120).  
 
• The tradition of "liberal compartmentalization," which runs from Immanuel Kant and 
G.W.F. Hegel to Michael Walzer and seeks to delineate a market realm in which 
possessive individualism is sanctioned but circumscribed by a separate sphere of 
personhood and sanctity. However, Radin argues, these rest on the problematic idea 
that "things 'internal' to the person are inalienable and things 'external' are freely 
alienable" (p. 54). It is easy to see how this is untenable: even an apartment rented 
from a rapacious landlord remains one's home, and there is socially recognized non-
market value in living in it under appropriate safety standards and with a right to 
privacy. Moreover -- and this will prove to be central to her full argument -- there are 
many contingent circumstances which operate to make viable the commodification of 
goods and which are also seen as having extra-market value and moral significance.  
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• Finally, the Marxian tradition, as exemplified by Georg Lukács, represents a counter-
archetype to universal complete commodification, which Radin sees as no less 
simplistic and a caricature for identifying real markets with an endless slide toward the 
market vision. She is thus critical of the 'domino theory' which she ascribes to Lukács: 
the belief that the market knows no bounds. For Radin, this wrongly implies that "a 
nonmarket regime cannot coexist with a market regime" (p. 46) and that that we 
cannot both recognize market prices but also other forms of value, that "we cannot 
both know the price of something and know that it is priceless" (p. 47). We will return 
in the conclusion to the limits of this aspect of Radin's analysis. 
 
 A second intervention relates to ways of analyzing how policy debates are shaped by 
political theories and the commodification rhetoric they embody. From Lukács Radin borrows a 
sense of how commodification rhetoric can penetrate beyond theory to a broader discursive 
realm of social norms, cultural values, popular debate and actual regulatory compromises 
instantiated in law and regulation. However, Radin argues (contra Lukács) that this broader 
discursive realm often contains what she calls "internally plural meaning" (p. 107), by which she 
means that such discourses may both describe important aspects of social and economic life in 
commodified (and with money value) and non-commodified form. This can play out at the 
societal level (what Radin calls the 'social aspect') in terms of social contestation over whether 
market or non-market ordering is appropriate. There is also a 'participant aspect' which concerns 
how particular individuals may work with conceptually heterogenous conceptual schemes. Both 
individuals and collective decision-making bodies might, for example, see a worker as earning a 
specific quantity of income but also as a person with dignity and rights. Individual and social 
worldviews may thus only unevenly incorporate political theories, and can range on a continuum 
from those which give high priority to commodification rhetoric to those which seek more 
broadly to abolish it. 
 Third, real world commodification processes reflect the built history of the social welfare 
institutions, political theories with their own ideals of commodification (or what we can call 
‘commodification imaginaries’), and the continuing influence of internally plural and non-market 
conceptual schemes. Radin uses the term 'incomplete commodification' arguing that "many 
 
 
 
 
 
 
things are … neither fully commodified nor fully removed from the market… For example, 
things that are subject to price controls are incompletely commodified because freedom to set 
prices is part of the traditional understanding of property and contract" (p. 21).  In fact, our 
inspiration to draw on Radin stems from her directly citing housing as an example: "Residential 
habitability requirements, safety regulation, and other forms of product-quality regulation all 
become contests over the issue of commodification" (p. 21). While her arguments are, in general, 
normative -- directed at social policy debates over applied issues such as organ donation and 
sales -- her account also invites empirical examination of how contested commodification 
actually plays out.  Real world commodification processes involve the play of different 
imaginaries for how to construct markets, some of which seek to incorporate 'non-market' values 
such as respect for human's basic needs and the integrity of a person. 
 Radin also acknowledges that legal decision-making must grapple with less than ideal 
situations: "There are complex and multifaceted forms of oppression and poverty that deprive 
millions of people of the opportunity to access in a timely manner sufficient and adequate food, 
shelter, and health care, and more generally strip them of the ability 'to lead a humane life'" (p. 
117). While concerns about the dignity of persons may lead many to advocate for banning 
'desperate exchanges' such as baby-selling, womb-renting or prostitution, doing so may lead to 
even worse results for the poorest and most oppressed members of our society. This is what 
Radin calls a double bind: A situation where either option -- banning a practice or permitting it -- 
is less than ideal. While she emphasizes that "justice requires that we consider changing the 
circumstances that create the dilemma" (p.124), she also recognizes that a double bind arises 
precisely where changing those circumstances is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable 
future. In such situations, the fact that "we still must choose a regime for the meantime" (p. 134) 
only strengthens the argument for case-by-case decision-making. 
 
Commodification as economy, law and discourse 
 
 Our analysis of the simultaneous legal formalization and ongoing illegality of basement 
suites in Vancouver follows Radin's discourse analytic treatment.  We see Radin's work as 
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containing important parallels with, and complementing, work on urban policy mobilities and on 
Chicago School neoliberalism as a strategic but ultimately incomplete project (Peck, 2011), and 
research on the way city policy rests on regulatory compromise mixing use and exchange value 
(Kipfer and Keil, 2002; While et. al. 2004). Radin helps highlight the play of discourse, its 
conceptual contents and the ultimate hybridity of regulation. Reading her in conjunction with 
these well-established urban political economic traditions also invites us to chart the process over 
time as discourse reshapes material economies, and to weigh the relative contribution and 
political power of different projects.  
  In our view the most central insight, and the one most in need of further elaboration 
through empirical example, is Radin's recognition that real world commodity processes mix law, 
economy and discourse in an ever shifting web. Rather than reflecting an unchanging 
'commodity form,' they are contact zones where diverse discourses meet and material 
configurations and social practices shift as part of what Warren Samuels has called the "legal-
economic nexus" (Samuels, 2007). Geographers have in different ways also made a similar 
point. Some theorists of Global Production Networks, such as Ray Hudson, outline how objects 
made for trade in markets should be seen as issuing from broader processes such as long distance 
networks linking sites of production and consumption, and which can be viewed from multiple 
registers: As economic processes driven by capital investment, as material systems which draw 
on natural resources, and as semiotic fields invested with cultural meaning and discursively 
framed state policy support (Hudson, 2008). There are parallels also to David Hulchanski's 
argument that housing can be traded in markets (as a commodity) but is better understood in the 
context of a system:  
 
 "Each country develops a relative unique housing system – a method of ensuring (or not) 
that enough good quality housing is built, that there is a fair housing allocation system, 
and that the stock of housing is properly maintained. Government plays the central role in 
creating, sustaining and changing this system. It establishes and enforces the 'rules of the 
game' through legislation defining everything from banking and mortgage lending 
practices to tax and regulatory measures affecting building materials, professional 
practices (e.g., real estate transactions), subsidy programs, and incentive patterns for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
average households. This system is so ingrained into the culture and so intertwined with 
related systems (such as tax measures and welfare state benefits) that it tends to be taken 
for granted." (Hulchanski, 2004, 222)  
 
We thus look to the overall process, configurations and layers of legal institutions whereby, as 
Radin argues, "our material relationships of production and exchange are interwoven with our 
discourse and our understanding of ourselves and the world" (Radin, 1996, 80). As our 
discussion of Vancouver's emergent basement suite regulatory regime shows, legal questions of 
whether to commodify (e.g. create permission) become intermixed with questions of how to 
commodify (the substance of enabling laws that shape markets and marketable objects). 
Property Law, Planning, and Context 
 The city of Vancouver is relatively young, and from the formation of the Colony of 
British Columbia (in the 1850s) until the 1880s the area featured Musqueam, Squamish and 
Tsleil-Waututh First Nation villages, European settler farms, and from 1867 a small town built 
around a saw mill. The British colonial government land grant policy allowed would-be 
landowners to stake out a lot -- up to 16 acres in size -- and then settle it by making 
"improvements" to it for a period of two years, at the end of which the right would be granted to 
purchase the title to the lot from the colonial government.  This minimalist property and contract 
system was not changed by the province's incorporation into Canada (in 1871) and gave rise to 
considerable land speculation in the growing city, as population jumped from 1,000 people in 
1881 to 100,000 by 1911 (MacDonald, 1992). 
 Formal planning came relatively late. Competition among land speculators eager to 
liquidate their investments had made real property affordable to many "common workers," 
especially out in the southeastern suburbs, creating the possibilities for a cross-class alliance in 
the protection of values (Holdsworth, 1986). In particular, there was a perceived need to protect 
residential neighbourhoods from unpleasant smells, fumes or noises from farming or industrial 
enterprises and "the rowdy behaviour associated with licensed hotels" (Weaver, 1979, 213). The 
City of Vancouver did impose building and fire code standards but relied in large part on a 
system of restrictive covenants -- a form of private agreement that lot buyers were required to 
sign as a condition of the sale, legally outlining a series of limits to what the new owners could 
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do with the land. Some new built developments, such as Shaughnessy, experimented with 
protective zoning in the 1910s (Ley, 1993). But by the late 1920 it was widely understood that 
there was a need for comprehensive planning in the city. The provincial government granted to 
the City of Vancouver the powers to enact a zoning bylaw, which it did in interim form early in 
1927 and more comprehensively at the end of 1928 with the adoption of elements of the 
Bartholomew and Associates' Master Plan (City of Vancouver, 1928).   
 Harland Bartholomew and Associates exemplified the new field of town planning, which 
situated individual home ownership in the context of projected urban growth: Master planning 
would incorporate concerns with hygiene, harmony and a public realm. This urban imaginary 
conceived of cities as "delicate living organisms, and failures to maintain their health could not 
be easily reversed" (Stanger-Ross, 2008, 551). Based in St. Louis Missouri, the firm made plans 
for cities throughout North America, strongly influenced by Frederick Law Olmsted Jr.'s 
suburban and romantic vision of segregating commercial and residential uses, with the latter to 
be single-family houses in regularized but well-treed streets. The new bylaws sectioned the city 
into districts and neatly divided uses -- non-residential uses (except for parks, schools and 
churches) were for the most part to be kept separate from residential ones. It sought to control 
residential densities, stipulating type of dwelling, the minimum site area that a dwelling could 
occupy on a lot, and the intensity of lot occupancy. While provisions were made for some areas 
to have two-family dwellings, three-storey multi-unit buildings, and six-storey multi-unit 
buildings, the majority of the city was laid out on the familiar grid iron format, with specification 
that only single-family dwellings be built. After the amalgamation of the city of Vancouver with 
its neighbouring municipalities of Point Grey and South Vancouver in 1929, more than 70 
percent of the city's land mass was covered by low-density districts devoted exclusively to 
single-family dwellings. 
 The Bartholomew vision remained normative for decades but in practice was only 
partially realized. By 1931 the economic downturn had created a need for low-income housing, 
and neighbourhoods near the city centre such as the West End, Kitsilano and Mout Pleasant 
began to experience a mass conversion of one-family houses into lodging rooms or apartments. 
Efforts to maintain single-family hegemony were further eroded during the Second World War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The War Measures Act, applied throughout Canada, encouraged homeowners to relieve wartime 
housing shortages by allowing suites in single-family homes (City of Vancouver, 2009a). 
 
Postwar Reinstatement  
 Housing policy in postwar Vancouver was strongly organized around reinstating the 
Bartholomew vision of homogenous owner-occupied zones. From the mid-1950s, council 
worked to end homeowners' rental of secondary suites, albeit allowing a temporary reprieve to 
"moratorium" suites. The City tacitly worked in conjunction with national Keynesian era 
demand-side policies that encouraged home ownership. Spurred by systems of mortgage support, 
tax subsidies and freeway investment, the rate of homeownership rose in conjunction with 
spreading suburbanization.  
 We can see also in this period a series of changes that sharpened commodification 
rhetoric around housing. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, established in 1946, 
focused public funds almost exclusively on the ownership sector and building up the amortized 
mortgage market. Homeowners paid no tax on profits (or 'capital gains') from selling their houses 
in a climate of expanding prices (Hulchanski, 2004). Large numbers of North Americans began 
to conceive of housing not only in terms of its consumption as a "materialization of home," but 
also as a "good" and even an investment asset that can be potentially traded at a profit (Smith, 
2008). Homeownership "seemed to offer exceptional opportunities for investment... Home 
ownership was not just a safe repository for savings, but the centrepiece of an investment 
portfolio" (Harris, 2009, 529). Through North America and Australia, local states sought to 
increase the supply of privately owned dwellings by establishing property rights in units of 
multi-unit buildings or condominiums. At the provincial level, but which proved to profoundly 
reshape the City of Vancouver, the Strata Titles Act (1966) compartmentalized land further into 
marketable 'air space parcels' the ownership of which could be traded and could provide security 
for loans (Harris, 2011).  
 By the early 1970s this 'air space parcel' thinking seems to have migrated to City of 
Vancouver specifications for single-family houses and basements. For decades, basement floor 
area was not counted in allowable floor area as long as the basement was not used as habitable 
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accommodation. In 1974, the zoning was amended to include the basement in the floor area 
calculation regardless of its use (City of Vancouver, 2009b). The concern at the time was that the 
allocation of allowable floor area was allowing visibly larger houses, and including basement 
space was a way to give the City greater zoning control. But the effect was also to encourage the 
commodification of subterranean space, now delineated by rules for allowable zoning. 
 There were at this time, however, significant countervailing trends reflecting non-
commodified understandings of housing. Through this period there was considerable shift across 
Canada away from laissez-faire property and contract law and the introduction (by the provincial 
governments) of a series of legal-realist inspired rules such as professional licensing and 
monitoring of real estate agents, anti-discrimination rules, and the formation of cooperative 
housing (Hulchanski, 1988). Some of these came late to British Columbia, such as reforms to 
landlord-tenancy law in 1970 that gave better protections to renters. Nationally, the Keynesian 
economic management paradigm viewed housing as not only a source of effective demand, but 
also as key to providing basic human needs and forging political consensus. Through the postwar 
era there were thus direct policies supporting low income rental and non-profit housing. This 
included direct cash transfers to the provinces and federal tax incentives for building rental 
properties.   
 While the official policy in Vancouver during this period was to eliminate unauthorized 
suites as a non-compliant land use, these efforts continuously met with seemingly unexpected 
difficulties. One example was the challenging question of how to legally define what constituted 
a family for the purposes of satisfying the single-family requirement of the zoning bylaws – a 
question that builders and homeowners -- especially those from non-Anglo-Saxon backgrounds 
and seeking to house their extended families -- repeatedly raised (Punter, 2003). The City thus 
made a series of exceptions, for example for suites occupied by parents, grandparents and 
children of the owner or where there might otherwise be financial or medical hardship of the 
owner or tenant (City of Vancouver, 2009a, 24).  
 
Towards Liberalization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 By the 1970s, there were increasing signs of liberalization and a gradual recognition that 
basement suites were providing needed low-income housing. The City was beginning to 
recognize that closing down all existing unauthorized secondary suites would have resulted in 
thousands of tenant households immediately losing their home, at a time when the supply of new 
purpose-built rental housing was already falling drastically behind a growing demand (Ley, 
1996). Initial steps in this direction occurred in 1974, when Council established a plebiscite 
process that resulted in the creation of the RS-1A zoning district in two small areas of the city 
(Kitsilano and Grandview-Woodlands). These would maintain the "single-family residential 
character" while allowing one secondary suite or additional dwelling unit in a single-family 
residence. Over time City Council adopted a policy of only enforcing secondary-suite regulations 
in cases where complaints were registered by a negatively impacted neighbour or tenant.  
 By 1987 the City was increasingly worried about maintaining a policy of non-
enforcement. On the one hand opponents of suites continued to argue against the "increased 
densities, commercial development, and higher land costs" that suites would bring (McMartin, 
1987). However, City staff estimated the numbers of basement suites at 26,000, and that as many 
as 30 percent of houses had suites in some eastside neighbourhoods (McMartin, 1987). There 
was an increased perception that the legality issue would need to be addressed. As alderwoman 
Carole Taylor argued, "We have to recognize it is a viable housing option or we have to get rid 
of it" (quoted in Bramham, 1989).  
 The City resorted once again to holding a plebiscite as part of the 1988 civil election, 
leading to a planning process of rezoning to provide legal sanction for existing and new suites. 
There was widespread opposition to the process in the city's west side (Bula, 2003a), reflecting 
the fact that higher valued west side properties are much less likely to have a suite than on the 
east side -- where rents from suites commonly serve as middle-class mortgage helpers.  
Nevertheless, this neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood review resulted in 47 percent of the single-
family-zoned properties ("RS-1") being rezoned to allow suites ("RS-1S") between 1989 and 
1992. While the intent was to phase out illegal suites (giving owners a 10-year period to permit, 
upgrade or close their suites), enforcement proved problematic: owners argued it would be too 
expensive to upgrade, or saw that they could evade the City's limited number of inspectors (City 
of Vancouver, 2009a). 
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 A further significant change came in 2004. The new centre-left government, dominated 
by the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE), initiated a series of studies to consider the 
basement suite issue. This included awarding an outside contract to an engineering firm to study 
standards and enforcement issues (City of Vancouver, 2001; City of Vancouver 2009a) and staff 
recommendations to consider legalization and regulation as part of an overall housing and 
homelessness action plan. The new mayor, Larry Campbell, spearheaded the issue, arguing that 
"we have to see [suites] as a realistic form of housing … Secondary suites help students, parents, 
relatives" (quoted in Bula, 2003a). Some basement suite detractors were driven by the desire to 
maintain the "single-family premium" -- "the quality of enjoyment and the value of their home" 
(City of Vancouver 2004, 7). Others saw suites as bringing unwanted (i.e. property price 
damaging) neighbourhood activity levels, parking problems, noise and 'problem premises'.  
 Mayor Campbell would have created a de facto amnesty, but City staff argued that for 
pre-existing suites there could be a slight relaxation (but not abandonment) of standards -- such 
as for building heights (from 7'6" to 6'6"), and allowing hard-wired smoke alarms rather than 
sprinkler systems (Bula, 2003b; City of Vancouver, 2004). The City ultimately adopted a set of 
new rules officially recognizing suites, allowing that they could be built in all areas of the city, 
prescribing building standards and requiring parking spaces, permits and business licenses, and 
limiting numbers to one suite per detached house (City of Vancouver, 2004; 2007). However, the 
City also made its non-enforcement policy explicit, meaning that homeowners could continue to 
operate non-permitted suites and in practice routinely ignore substantive requirements around 
codes and standards as long as neighbours did not complain.  
 
Commodification Redux  
 It is tempting (but as we will explain ultimately unsatisfactory) to see the City's policy as 
one of 'raising a white flag on basement suites' -- as one newspaper headline put it (Allen, 2004) 
-- and acquiescing to expanding market forces.  Basement suites represent the physical 
transformation of the spaces of a house. Areas that were formerly not considered part of living 
space -- and so contributing little to house price -- are now seen as revenue generators. While 
often repairs are done by homeowners themselves, it is not difficult to find framers and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
carpenters who advertise their expertise in remaking basements, and contractors who specialize 
in retrofitting suites into (relatively) livable spaces.  It is now routine for sales listings to cite as a 
selling feature the income potential of illegal suites in detached dwellings, signalling that the 
suite's status as a mortgage helper shapes negotiations over house price. Major mortgage lending 
institutions such as Vancouver City Savings Credit Union do not consider whether suites are 
legal or illegal but allow borrowers to add (potential) rental income in calculating ability to 
service mortgage debt (Smart Growth, 2003). Suites fit into a broader trend whereby households 
look to exchange value to replace the roll back of the state's commitment to social spending—
using home equity (and rental income) as a potential replacement for lacking pensions and 
employment insurance (Allon, 2010).  
 Suites in Vancouver are notorious for having bad conditions. Typical violations include 
creating more than one suite on a given site, keeping lower-than-permitted ceiling heights, and 
carrying out substandard electrical or plumbing installations. There is a widespread perception 
that owners can rent out such suites and face little risk of being penalized by local authorities. In 
this context, a laissez-faire "complete commodification" ethos would argue that tenants exhibit a 
market-based choice to accept sub-standard conditions, trading housing quality for affordable 
rent.  
 We would argue, however, that the situation does not reflect an instance of "complete 
commodification." Houses (and their basement suites) are after all also homes -- meeting needs 
"for security and a setting for family and community life" (Mendez et. al. 2006, 101) and 
inscribed with "ideas about privacy, intimacy, domesticity and comfort" (Mallet, 2004, 67). As 
such, basement suites serve as an example of how "our culture stubbornly insists on conceiving 
of the person as a moral agent, as a subject distinct from a world of objects, yet how at the same 
time our culture persistently commodifies and objectifies" (Radin, 1996, 131).  
 First, drawing on Radin's idea of the "participant aspect" we argue that individual 
homeowners also take on non-commodified understandings. In their own drive towards home 
ownership, homeowners who rent out their basement do not simply seek 'utility' but are in part 
motivated by securing the standard of a single-family home in tight times: they are in other 
words driven by Fordist-Keynesian consumption ideals and the marker of a single family 
dwelling as a mark of identity and personhood. This mixture of utilitarian, security, and symbolic 
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motivations and attachments is a clear example of Radin's "internally plural meanings."  
Moreover, our visits to more than 30 basement apartments available for rent in the city revealed 
that some owners of illegal secondary suites seek to compensate for their code violations by 
spending significant amounts of money turning their rental units into pleasant spaces for tenants 
to live in, including the installation of brand new appliances and sound-proof ceilings. To some 
extent, this reflects both a (commodified) response to a competitive environment and a (non-
commodified) normative concern for the well-being of potential tenants. More importantly, we 
suggest that these extra-legal norms work as part of the institutional setting and regulatory 
context that shapes how basement suites are commodified -- and creates a unique form of 
variation from laissez-faire ideals.  
 Secondly, we also can cite a number of further departures from laissez-faire suggested by 
what Radin refers to as the "social aspect" -- broad societal level policy debates and discourses. 
There is the continued relevance of the Olmsted-Bartholomew vision for the city, and the way 
the marker of acceptance of suites continues to be whether they preserve the single-family 
'character' of Vancouver neighbourhoods. Existence of building codes and standards reflect 
societal beliefs in minimum standards, which we do not feel are easily explainable through 
utilitiarian calculus (as some law and economic scholars attempt to do). Code continues to have 
some (albeit limited) normative sway: the City does enforce bylaws and building standards if 
neighbours complain about a secondary suite, and this both gives some strength to these 
regulations while accentuating those that speak to neighbourhood 'feel' and localized impacts on 
nearby homeowners.  
 But most significantly, the legalization rhetoric was dominated by the pragmatic need to 
address the city's housing shortage. As City staff reports on the issue routinely note: "Suites are 
seen as an essential component of the affordable rental stock, providing reasonably priced rental 
housing for students and young adults, older individuals, and low income couples and families" 
(City of Vancouver, 2006). While basement suites often represent substandard housing, 
Vancouver has had a long term and significant housing shortage and the city and its region are 
known for having the most expensive housing markets of Canada's major urban areas, as well as 
for being among the priciest of the metropolitan world. The metropolitan region's fast growth 
(for instance at 14.5 percent between 1999 and 2009) has meant that there has been a near 
 
 
 
 
 
 
constant squeeze on housing in the City of Vancouver. The result has been high ownership and 
rental costs for housing and very low vacancy rates. Moreover, salaries in the region do not 
compensate: Housing prices in Vancouver became dislocated from the local economy as a result 
of pressures imposed by the heightened globalization of people and financial capital (Ley and 
Murphy, 2001). Secondary suites have come to be regarded as a way to facilitate middle-class 
home ownership. As a result, City authorities -- and the public more generally -- may have more 
sympathy for the perspective of marginal owners, for example, early on in their housing career 
when they are struggling to break in to the ownership market and want to use secondary suites to 
help them do so. 
 Basement suites thus represent a much needed source of supply for those who cannot 
afford to 'get in' to Vancouver's strong ownership market. Developers have not shown any desire 
to build rental housing but instead have been eager to cater to new owners through building 
smaller condominiums. Developers can obtain very high returns for private condominiums -- 40 
percent by one city report, in contrast to a two percent return for purpose-built rental housing 
(City of Vancouver, 2008). Spreads as high as 57 percent for condominiums versus 1.69 percent 
for rental have been reported from the suburb of Langley (McClanaghan and Copas, 2006). The 
result is that of 96,734 housing units built in the metropolitan area between 2001 and 2006, only 
6,808 were purpose-built rental (Metro Vancouver, 2010). Most of the purpose-built rental units 
in the city are now at least four decades old (City of Vancouver, 2008) and many have been 
converted from rental and upgraded to expensive condominiums. In the five-year period from 
2001 to 2006, the number of tenant-occupied dwelling units fell to 131,500 in 2006 from a peak 
of 132,755 in 2001 (Cityspaces Consulting, 2009).  
 The situation is exacerbated by neoliberal policy shifts. By the 1980s the federal 
government had dropped its tax subsidy regime for rental investments (and reintroduced capital 
gains tax on rental properties) with the effect of dampening construction of new rental properties 
in subsequent decades (Drummond et. al. 2004). Governments are highly unlikely to resuscitate 
them, being not only an expensive subsidy but also oriented as they were to the broad rental 
market rather than being targeted at the low-income end (Drummond, 2004). Generally, the 
federal and provincial governments have embarked on long-term strategies of exit from social 
housing provision. While in the post-war era the federal government used direct grants for social 
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housing and preferential tax treatment for rental housing investment, this was administered 
through long-term contractual commitments to the provinces that in turn managed low- and 
moderate-income public housing and encouraged non-profit and co-operative housing programs. 
However through the 1990s the federal government gradually reduced its role, ending the federal 
co-operative housing program, not increasing budgets for social housing to match inflation, and 
mandating year over year decreases in funding for the Canadian Housing and Mortgage 
Corporation's budget (Begin, 1999).  
 The result is that the legalization of basement suites in Vancouver was championed by 
progressive organizations in part as a necessary measure to cope with the affordable housing gap. 
The Tenants' Rights Action Coalition (TRAC) and other groups in the centre-left actively 
campaigned between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s for the regularization of this type of 
housing unit (Smart Growth, 2003; City of Vancouver, 2009a), arguing that aggressively 
enforcing habitability requirements by shutting down offending suites would restrict the supply 
of one of the few sources of rental housing available to low-income tenants in the city. Some 
politicians within the larger metropolitan area agreed: "If we shut them all down tomorrow, we 
would have a huge crisis in affordability" (Councillor Marvin Hunt of Surrey, quoted in Bula 
2003a). As journalist Francis Bula explained at the time, "[if municipal authorities] force owners 
to legalize, they run the risk of creating a housing disaster as landlords are forced to shut down 
what has become a major source of affordable housing" (Bula 2003a).  
 The 2004 changes to basement suite regulation were driven by a largely left-wing City 
Council (which included long time social housing advocate Jim Green), and were consistent with 
a stated position of opposing and condemning federal and provincial off-loading of social 
welfare and housing responsibilities (City of Vancouver, 2003). There has thus been a large-
scale move away from the paternalism of the old single family/building code arrangement and a 
recognition of the perils of strict enforcement. Radin reminds us that there are cases where 
"market-inalienability -- especially if enforced through criminalization of sales -- may cause 
harm to ideals of personhood instead of maintaining and fostering them" (2006, 132). While 
prohibiting the rental of basement suites through strict bylaw enforcement is not the same as 
their "criminalization," Radin's broader insight remains valid here: The new policy of tolerating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sub-standard housing conditions legitimized suites as a way for low-income households to meet 
their housing needs, but did so in the context of a severe shortage of affordable housing. 
 
Greening Commodification  
 Urban environmental activists were another force seeking regularization of Vancouver's 
basement suites. Within this movement, the Smart Growth agenda has characteristically focused 
on rethinking planning to consider the needs for densification, create mixed-use neighbourhoods 
and re-orientate cities away from car use and sprawl. Rather than seeing 'nature' through a 
suburban (or nuclear-family oriented) vision of opulent parks and houses on commerce-free tree-
lined boulevards, Smart Growth shifts the focus to protecting agricultural land and mitigating 
climate change. By the mid-1990s the City had begun to incorporate these principles -- the 1995 
City Plan for instance called for increasing neighbourhood housing variety throughout the city 
and giving people the opportunity to stay in their neighbourhood as their housing needs change.  
 In April 2003, the local organization Smart Growth BC helped organize a workshop that 
was instrumental in the City adopting new laws legalizing basement suites. The current 
Bartholomew-inspired zoning system was identified as a barrier to Smart Growth and to the 
possibility of "accommodating the thousands of new people who want to live here" (Smart 
Growth, 2003, 2). As the organization's then-executive director made clear, densification had to 
be embedded in various social values. She thus argued that basement suites ensure affordable 
rental units that are currently not provided through other sources, that the rental revenues they 
provide can serve as mortgage helpers in an expensive market, and that their existence allows 
density increases without "changing the character of a community" (Smart Growth, 2003, 2). The 
centre-left-dominated City government at the time was broadly supportive of the Smart Growth 
agenda, and the arguments were likely influential in the City of Vancouver's decision to legalize 
suites. By 2004 City staff was explicitly linking this policy orientation to basement suites (City 
of Vancouver, 2004). In 2005, the City's newly created Cool Vancouver Task Force released a 
Community Climate Change Action Plan, in which the legalization of suites throughout the city's 
single-family neighbourhoods was lauded as a positive Smart Growth initiative (Cool Vancouver 
Task Force, 2005, 19). While there is an academic tradition that links Smart Growth to urban 
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entrepreneurialism and capital accumulation (While et. al., 2004), our analysis suggests that 
proponents of this agenda do not show a monolithic face, and different formulations vary along 
the commodification-rhetoric spectrum. For instance, Smart Growth BC has been careful to 
accentuate the need for social housing provision (Curran and Wake, 2008).    
 By 2007, however, a new mayor and council led by Sam Sullivan of the centre-right Non-
Partisan Association were pushing what they called the “EcoDensity Initiative”. EcoDensity 
tracked much closer to ‘complete commodification’ rhetoric, claiming as it did that liberalizing 
zoning laws to increase building density would be good for the environment. This was far more 
explicit about seeking to rupture the Olmsted-Bartholomew vision of the City to allow 
developers to densify. Basement suites were to be just one way to achieve greater density, 
alongside new types of mid-rise buildings along arterial routes and in areas such as Chinatown 
where there was a tradition of anti-gentrification activism opposed to new-build condominiums. 
The EcoDensity Initiative constituted a significant push to utilize environmental concern to 
commodify previously unexploited airspace parcels. The mere fact of density was assumed to 
have a trickle-down effect on house prices. As Marit Rosol (2013, 2251) argues, EcoDensity 
operated as "a discursive strategy whose aim was to gain acceptance of densification."  
 Rosol's fieldwork shows how opponents of EcoDensity identified the initiative with a 
commodifying agenda. Protestors felt that it deceptively sold densification for profit, using 
environmental discourses to legitimize density in order to serve developers and rich 
condominium buyers. Others saw EcoDensity as a push to displace poorer residents and 
exacerbate gentrification. They were afraid that renters would be evicted and homeowners would 
be 'taxed out'-- i.e. forced to sell their property due to increased property taxes as a consequence 
of rezoning. Activists from the low-income downtown neighbourhood known as the Downtown 
Eastside were especially vocal, as they saw in the plan an underhanded tactic for introducing 
condominium towers into their neighbourhood, fearing further gentrification and loss of 
affordable housing in a neighbourhood already under massive socioeconomic and development 
pressure. Their concerns echoed both Radin's argument that "physical and social contexts are 
integral to personal individuation, to self development" (p. 56) and Chester Hartman's argument 
that city dwellers have "the right to stay put" (Newman and Wyly, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There was also some doubt concerning Sam Sullivan's invocation of supply-demand 
dynamics and the commodification-rhetoric it embodied. As Rosol explains, even the City staff 
reports at the time acknowledged that affordability would only be indirectly addressed, and that 
densification could at best moderate future price increases relative to what they would otherwise 
have been. Widespread social opposition was also focused on the ways densification would clash 
with 'livability', at times expressed as a direct concern that services and amenities would not be 
increased, but at other times meant as a cover for protecting the city's 'character', that which 
"makes it such a good place to live" (read, Anglo-Saxon-identified single-family housing) 
(Rosol, 213, 2248). Opponents thus cited "green overcrowding" (Rosol, 2013, 2248). Moreover, 
there was widespread disdain at how Mayor Sullivan seemed to be circumventing the City's 
"republican" (Radin 1996, 182) political traditions of public consultation in favour of an 
economics-and-efficiency inspired vision that was being imposed top down.  
On June 10, 2008, Council adopted the EcoDensity Charter and approved a set of 
EcoDensity Actions, including as a priority action the expansion of options for secondary suites 
(City of Vancouver, 2009b). The EcoDensity vision was largely unsuccessful, but some of its 
component policies were instituted, such as expanding condominiums into Chinatown (directly 
adjacent the Downtown Eastside), and the largely bipartisan City staff initiatives to expand 
basement suites. Staff had actively investigated ways in which basement suites could be made 
nicer places to live and easier for home builders to incorporate into initial designs for newly 
build housing -- effectively shifting the concept to one of creating multi-unit buildings with the 
resemblance of single-family homes. This incremental step could easily fit within the agenda of 
earlier governments -- or the progressive version of Smart Growth -- to expand rental stock. 
After public hearings, Council approved zoning changes to enable full-size basements and more 
livable basement suites in all areas zoned for single-family dwellings (City of Vancouver, 
2009c). The changes included a slight relaxation of floor space ratios from 0.6 to 0.7, allowing 
basements to be built two feet higher out of the ground, and increasing total building height (if 
only by one foot). In addition, the 'flexi-unit' concept -- allowing developers to build secondary 
suites in some apartments ("suites within suites") -- was also extended to new brownfield 
redevelopment sites such as the East Fraser Lands and Southeast False Creek.  
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 City monitoring has found that these shifts have been effective in accelerating the 
building of basement suites -- more new houses now have basements, increasing from just over 
30 percent of permits issued in 2000, to over 88 percent in 2011. The number of new houses with 
a permitted suite has also increased significantly. Until 2007, about 5 percent of new houses 
included an approved suite at the time of construction. Since then, this percentage has increased 
steadily, from 10 percent of new houses in 2008 to 34 percent in 2011 (over 300 suites in 2011) 
(City of Vancouver, 2012). City zoning laws had effectively reshaped house construction in the 
city, moving basement suites from an illegitimate anomaly to official local state practice.  
 
Conclusion: From the double bind to the domino effect  
 Following Radin's theory of incomplete commodification, this paper has shown how 
issues of whether to permit commodification and how to permit commodification -- in this case 
how to legalize market activity -- are intertwined. Through the 90-year history canvassed in this 
paper, basement suites have been inseparable from the commodification of housing -- whether 
this be through a commitment to banning suites in pursuit of ideas of home ownership and the 
single-family premium, or expanding suites to allow broader middle-class access to ownership 
and fulfil social policy goals of rental housing affordability for working class residents. Even 
though diverse policies were promoted for maintaining or accelerating property values, they 
differed in terms of how diverse non-market values were articulated and hybridized into 
commodification imaginaries. Questions of how to permit commodification extend beyond 
simply juxtaposing (and so trading off) exchange value and use value, and include a host of 
strategic decisions and assumptions about whose exchange values should be prioritized and how 
other values can be selectively incorporated and synthesized into the process. Within the ambit 
of this 'how' question there is still ample room for critique concerning the way this is done and 
whether regulation embodies principles of personhood, human flourishing and ecological 
integrity. 
 Applying Radin's work in a social science context also requires moving from mere 
discourse analysis to chart how regulatory compromise occurred over time and as part of the 
ongoing development of commodity systems. As the case of Vancouver's basement suites shows, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the issue is not only that there is a diversity of discourses but also contestation between them, 
and despite some hybridity and compromise, there are winners and losers in this process. But 
conducting a systematic process-based analysis that extends over time in turn suggests the need 
to move beyond Radin in important ways, in order to consider the forces that drive 
commodification and the regulatory compromises that settle how to permit it.  
 The issue in our opinion is not simply whether in a particular conjuncture more 
commodification is legally warranted, but also how legalizing commodification does beget more 
commodification. In the case of Vancouver, the City's contradictory approach of legalizing and 
not enforcing is a response not only to a double bind, but a bind created by the inscription of 
neoliberal (commodification-rhetoric heavy) policies at the local level by other layers of 
government. The City's decision to authorize basement suites occurred in the broader contexts of 
housing market design -- strongly informed by neoliberal commodification rhetoric -- and 
created a structural context that then shaped local state policy. Recall that the City of Vancouver 
itself participates in creating the current housing system -- in its past history of zoning, allocation 
of its own property, and property taxes charged. Suites are but a small ameliorative measure in 
an overall system of the commodification of housing -- strongly skewed as it is towards home 
ownership for the middle classes and the wealthy. 
 While Radin is quick to dismiss the 'domino theory,' she ignores a much broader concern 
raised by the Marxist tradition. Radin helps show that the ‘commodity form’ is not unitary and 
can contain many use values that allow market and non-market to coexist. But she overlooks 
how this works together with the ways capitalist economies include tendencies, often operating 
slowly but over decades, for markets to colonize non-market aspects of society and nature -- 
whether this be social customs, unexploited resources, wilderness areas or urban air space 
(Castree, 2003, 2008). We acknowledge that there are limits to this process and agree that 
commodification cannot go "all the way down" (Fraser, 2014).  However, we do think it is still 
an important social scientific task to interrogate and understand the dynamics and spread of 
commodification in all its specificity. If questions about 'whether to permit commodification' 
suggest social policy reflecting societal counter-tendencies to this ongoing process, the question 
of 'how to permit commodification' speaks to the way capitalism can morph to accommodate and 
absorb social opposition. In reality, and as our case study shows, these often go hand in hand: the 
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expansion of commodification into new domains can be made more legitimate precisely through 
a combination of regulation that ameliorates its most offensive effects while providing a 
necessarily compromised respite from double binds. 
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